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Institutional Metaphors for Designing
Large-Scale Distributed AI versus AI
Techniques for Running Institutions
Alexander Boer and Giovanni Sileno
Abstract Artificial Intelligence (AI) started out with an ambition to reproduce the
human mind, but, as the sheer scale of that ambition became apparent, quickly re-
treated into either studying specialized intelligent behaviours, or proposing overar-
ching architectural concepts for interfacing specialized intelligent behaviour compo-
nents, conceived of as agents in a kind of organization. This agent-based modeling
paradigm, in turn, proves to have interesting applications in understanding, simulat-
ing, and predicting the behaviour of social and legal structures on an aggregate level.
This chapter examines a number of relevant cross-cutting concerns, conceptualiza-
tions, modeling problems and design challenges in large-scale distributed Artificial
Intelligence, as well as in institutional systems, and identifies potential grounds for
novel advances.
1 Introduction
These days, analogies carry easily between simulations of social settings and ar-
chitectures for minds. We for instance casually speak of electronic and computa-
tional institutions as alternatives for traditional institutional arrangements, in recog-
nition of the increasingly important role that the digital world, and automated deci-
sion making, plays within our social structures. Equally casually, normative multi-
agent systems, based on institutionalist vocabulary, may be introduced as a design
metaphor for large-scale distributed Artificial Intelligence (AI).
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2 Alexander Boer and Giovanni Sileno
Drawing from existing work in agent-based modeling in the area of law, we ex-
amine in this chapter a number of relevant cross-cutting concerns, conceptualiza-
tions, modeling problems and design challenges that apply to both large-scale dis-
tributed Artificial Intelligence and agent-based modeling and simulation of social-
institutional structures.
1.1 Modeling the Mind
As a discipline, Artificial Intelligence (AI) started out with an ambition to reproduce
the human mind as a monolithic computer program. The problem of reproducing in-
telligence in technology was taken on as an ambitious functional decomposition ex-
ercise, with intelligence playing the role of the high-level function to be reproduced
in a computer program through reconstruction from smaller functions realized by
simple well-understood input-output modules.
The nature of the constituent primitive modules was already clear to early com-
puter scientists: logical inference and knowledge structures should play a key role,
because introspection, common sense psychology and current concepts of rational-
ity suggested so (Newell and Simon, 1976). The General Problem Solver of Newell,
Shaw, and Simon (1959) may be considered the archetype of this approach, and is
often used in this role in lectures about the history of AI. In architectures of this type,
the problem of scaling up from the simplest toy examples of reasoning to plausible
intelligent function, even in restricted cognitive niches, becomes one of managing
a complex knowledge representation in a logic-based representation language, with
the properties of the logical language enforcing some of the required modularity, or
non-interaction, between the represented knowledge structures.
As soon as this required modularity breaks down, that is, when knowledge struc-
tures interact in unforeseen and undesirable ways, the construction of the higher
level function intelligence may catastrophically fail, in an obvious way if we are
lucky, for instance if the constraints enforced by the representation language are
violated, or insidiously, through unintelligent behaviour, in many other cases. The
AI system following this architectural paradigm, from an engineering point of view,
in a sense lacks sufficient adaptive capacity, or resilience, to reliably deal with the
addition of new knowledge structures.
1.2 The Scale Problem
The scale problem, in an architecture of this type, continually presents itself as a
knowledge representation problem: there is always too little background knowledge
available to correctly scope knowledge structures, and eventually the system will
make inferences that are not true, and, more importantly, obviously not intelligent.
Hence we historically find attempts in AI:
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• To uncover and study types of background assumptions like for instance the
infamous frame assumption (Morgenstern, 1996) that are usually overlooked
and threaten modularity;
• To codify massive amounts of common sense background knowledge for general
AI use (Lenat, 1995), in the hope of eventually reaching critical mass;
• To find at least some knowledge structures that have universal appeal, and there-
fore exhibit the required modularity from an engineering point of view, and
codify these as definitions into so-called top ontologies (Sowa, 1995) for reuse
among the different modules of a distributed system, and
• To try to scope defeasibility in logical reasoning (Pollock, 1975) and restore the
required modularity by designing new logics and representation languages that
deal with defeasibility in a principled manner, containing undesirable interactions
between knowledge structures.
The research tradition that deals with these problems is historically called the
symbolic AI tradition. Its main impact is perhaps in steering away the mainstream
philosophy of the field from mathematical logic and a disdain of logical inconsis-
tency and irrationality, and bringing it towards more psychologically valid views of
reasoning and rationality.
Another, concurrent response to the scale problem has been to decompose the AI
problem into two more manageable types of problems, licensing AI researchers to
limit their attention to either:
1. studying well-defined specialized intelligent behaviours (e.g. playing chess, or
recognizing human faces, or finding good solutions to a job-shop scheduling
problem) in specific contexts of use, and
2. proposing overarching architectural concepts for interfacing specialized intelli-
gent behaviour components. These are conceived of as agents, each competent in
a limited number of intelligent behaviours, in a kind of virtual organization cre-
ating and maintaining the appearance of being one (more) generally intelligent
agent to the outside world.
Solving the first type of problem has direct, viable commercial applications that
justify financing research, but is often belittled as not-really-AI due to its obvious
lack of adaptive potential. Solving the second problem has traditionally received
little attention, but in recent years is sometimes indirectly considered in the context
of addressing the responsibility gap caused by increasing reliance on networks of
autonomous systems (e.g. autonomous vehicles, or autonomous weapons).
1.3 Engineering a Mind as an Ecology of Minds
For the purposes of this chapter, we are mainly concerned with the second problem:
architectural concepts. Archetypical for this response are the agents in the visionary
society of mind of Minsky (1988) (“The power of intelligence stems from our vast
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diversity, not from any single, perfect principle”, p. 308), but also the more con-
crete intelligent creatures of Brooks (1991) in Intelligence without representation.
According to Brooks, the fundamental decomposition of intelligence should not be
into modules which must interface with each other via a shared knowledge repre-
sentation, but into independent creatures, that interface directly to an environment
through perception and action, and exhibit a certain ecological validity within that
environment, whatever that environment may be. The key takeaway here is to con-
sider the relationship between the creature and the environment, niche, or ecology
it lives in.
Clearly, specialized intelligent behaviours in a specific niche can often be suc-
cessfully isolated. Some problems, e.g. playing chess, may be successfully attacked
with specialized, explicit knowledge representation and an appropriate search algo-
rithm. Others, e.g. face recognition, are less amenable to solution by introspection,
and may be achieved not with knowledge representation, but with machine learning
algorithms on large databases of correctly labeled examples that exemplify the intel-
ligent behaviour to be acquired. We are indeed increasingly becoming accustomed to
the ability of computers to perform well in specific intelligent behaviours in specific
contexts, often even beyond the levels of performance attainable to human beings.
At the same time, we are aware that techniques do not generalize beyond a specific
niche, and do not generally label them as intelligent, perhaps because we intuitively
understand they lack the adaptive capacity that characterizes true intelligence.
The second problem of AI identified above, i.e. of finding architectural concepts
for creating and maintaining the appearance of being one agent, has given us multi-
agent systems, composed of multiple interacting agents in an environment, each
with independent perception and action functions, and no global knowledge of the
social system of which they are part. A key property of multi-agent system archi-
tecture is that there is no central controller agent with dictatorial powers over the
others, as this would simply be the functional decomposition approach that does
not work. Instead more complex forms of organization and control are investigated,
always with the ulterior goal of improving adaptive capacity of systems.
Although multi-agent system research has yielded many valuable theoretical in-
sights into the functioning of organizations, no examples spring to mind of systems
of practical value that successfully combine interesting sets of intelligent behaviours
using this paradigm. It is however interesting to consider one well known system
that does combine different intelligent behaviours and has demonstrated some suc-
cess in finding the right intelligent creature for the right ecological niche: IBMs
Watson (Ferrucci et al., 2010). Watson has, amongst other applications, shown great
competence at winning the game show Jeopardy, and is famous mainly for that
achievement. Clearly it does, from our perspective, only one thing very well: an-
swering questions (QA). But the interesting thing is that it answers different kinds of
questions using a number of completely different QA approaches with overlapping
competence. Architecturally, it behaves like a coalition of intelligent QA creatures
that compete against each other to produce the best answer to a question, and in
the process of doing so it acquires feedback on its performance and becomes better
at selecting the best competitor based on features of the question and the proposed
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answer. This competitive setting in itself is a convincing example of a winning de-
parture from the traditional functional decomposition approach, and a move towards
more interesting organizational metaphors.
Multi-agent system technologies and concepts have thus far enjoyed most suc-
cess indirectly as fuel for the agent-based modeling paradigm with interesting ap-
plications in understanding, simulating, and predicting the behaviour of real-world
socio-legal structures on an aggregate level. However, agent-based modeling deals
with a different type of problem, somehow dual to the ecological perspective illus-
trated above: settling which elements are required to specify one agents behaviour.
Whereas specifications based on simple reflex architectures or mathematical func-
tions are plausibly sufficient for studying certain phenomena of scale that may be
understood even using simplistic models of economic rationality, the human vocab-
ulary concerning social actors often refers to intentional and normative categories,
focusing primarily on qualitative rather than quantitative aspects of behaviour. Since
the beginning of the 90s, research efforts have been put in place on cognitive agents
and normative multi-agent systems, aiming to define agreed computational infras-
tructures building upon inferential interpretative templates such as the theory of
mind and various theories of normative positions from law, institutional economics,
and linguistics. Theory of mind is exemplified by the belief-desire-intention or BDI
agent paradigm of i.a. Bratman (1987), and Rao and Georgeff (1995). The normative
positions input usually draws from literature on norms (Alchourro´n and Bulygin,
1971), normative relationships (Hohfeld, 1913), and speech acts (Austin, 1975).
Typically, the main objective of these contributions is not to provide empirically
plausible models of human reasoning, but to maintain a high-level but exact spec-
ification of the agent from an external perspective using terminology that remains
comprehensible for humans.
1.4 Purpose and Plan of the Chapter
This short introduction gave an informal overview over general concerns shared
by AI and computer science on the one hand, and cognitive, social, and legal sci-
ences on the other. At closer inspection, however, cross-pollinations between these
domains are driven by different motivations. Limiting our view to a technical fea-
sibility perspective, we are facing two different complex adaptive system design
problems, to be solved with the same knowledge resources:
• the problem of modeling, simulating, and reasoning about complex socio-institu-
tional arrangements like law, markets, business, etc.
• the problem of designing complex information system arrangements based on
design metaphors drawing from vocabulary on minds and institutions.
Clearly, application domains like electronic institutions are particularly fascinat-
ing for researchers from both traditions, because they make us face both design
problems at once.
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Our present aim is to introduce the main challenges at stake on both sides, in a
way to inspire the reader to further reflection. For this purpose, we prefer a high-
level, non-technical presentation over an exhaustive literature review. In the con-
cluding section, we identify a number of potential grounds for novel advances in
the application of institutional metaphors to distributed AI, and the application of
AI techniques in modeling, analyzing, and evaluating social-institutional arrange-
ments.
2 Agency as Unity
2.1 External and Internal Views
In abstract terms, all problems reviewed in the introduction are expressions of a gen-
eral tension between unity and multiplicity. Multiplicity attempts to recover where
unity fails, or to achieve what cannot begin to be achieved by individuals alone;
on the other hand, multiplicity is made up of unities, which, seen as an aggregate,
might qualify as a unity again. Recursively, unities might contain multiplicities in
themselves. In this reconstruction, two points of view co-exist: external (addressing
a unity acting within an environment) and internal (addressing a system with several
components). An organization can be seen externally as one single socio-economic
actor, consuming and producing certain resources (products, services, etc.) for cer-
tain goals; internally, it can be seen for instance as an arrangement of roles embodied
by individual employees, but also by a network of business units, daughter organi-
zations and coordinated partners. In the same way, a decision-support system or the
guidance system of an autonomous vehicle can be seen as single pieces of software,
producing results relevant to a given task, given certain computational and infor-
mational resources; or as wholes of interconnected modules providing functions
necessary for the system to run. Not unexpectedly, internal and external views can
be found in standard modeling practices, cf. UML; or in software engineering, with
notions as orchestration and choreography.
But why is something seen as a unity (externally) or as a multiplicity (internally)?
More precisely, as we are dealing here with entities meant to act within the world,
what does it mean to appear to be one agent to the outside world?
2.2 What Agents Look Like, Externally
When interpreting a scene, observers frame it depending on the most pertinent cut
determined by their point of view. Taking a famous example by Hart and Honor
(1985), a farmer may see a drought as producing a great famine in his country, but
an international authority may instead put responsibility on the government of that
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country, because it has not prevented it by building up adequate reserves. Plausi-
ble criteria used to settle upon the stance for the observer to apply are the infor-
mativity (the capacity of drawing relevant conclusions with it), and the cognitive
effort required (cf. relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986), simplicity theory
(Dessalles, 2013)). Amongst the possible interpretative attitudes available to the ob-
server, the intentional stance (Dennett, 1987) is more prone to prediction errors, but
also the one producing highly informative results at reasonable cost. For instance, it
would be difficult to interpret a childs action towards approaching some sweets by
utilizing only information about his physical state or by evolutionary considerations.
Similar considerations apply also on the interpretation of the behaviour of groups,
organizations, countries, or artificial intelligent systems as intentional agents.
2.3 Intentional Ascriptions and Articulations as Reasons
Taking an intentional stance, observers attribute to an agent beliefs, desires, and
intents; and consider him as a rational entity, i.e. one which “will act to further its
goals in the light of its beliefs” (Dennett, 1987), and they can construct, with an
adequate approximation, what he will do next. Seeing this process as enabling the
ascription of reasons to explain the conduct of an agent, we reveal the constituents
of mentalization (Fonagy and Target, 1997), or more precisely, of rationalization of
behaviour. A certain entity (a person, a country, a natural phenomenon) is seen as an
agent because observers are able to ascribe certain beliefs, desires, and intents to it
obtaining relatively correct predictions. The same applies when one agent observes
introspectively his own behaviour, articulating his motivations as reasons for action.
Both having articulated beliefs, desires, and intents, and being able to ascribe
beliefs, desires, and intents to an agent clearly assist in communication between
social agents. Mercier and Sperber (2011) make this point forcefully: evolutionary
speaking, the main function of reasoning using knowledge structures must be argu-
mentation.
However, a different outcome might be expected depending whether we take the
agent or the observer point of view. Traditional experiments on confirmation bias
in human reasoning consistently show an interesting imbalance between produc-
ing and evaluating arguments: when arguing for a claim, humans seem to suffer
strongly from confirmation bias (i.e. of selectively collecting or remembering evi-
dence), but when arguing against the same claim they are capable of refuting weak,
biased arguments based on selective use of evidence. Mercier and Sperber point out
connections between the outcomes of these experiments and the rationality of the
process of dialectical argumentation in a court setting, of which one could say that
overall it aims (and generally succeeds) at producing truth even if the arguing par-
ticipants are just trying to win an argument. This setting is ruled by the burden of
proof, the duty to produce evidence for claims (Walton, 1988). Burdens of proof
are systematically allocated to agents based on whether winning the claim improves
ones position, and, when one considers legal norms, burdens of proof can generally
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be statically allocated to propositions in the condition of a rule. When considered
from the perspective of burden of proof, the charge of irrationality in producing ar-
guments loses its force. Instead we wonder how rules become statically connected
to communication settings, and which part of a rule exists to serve which interest.
2.4 Scripting Behaviour and the Resulting Ecology
But how it is possible for an observer to ascribe a certain behaviour to the agent,
when in principle the number of courses of action the agent might be committed to
is infinite? In the traditional approach to decision theory, a rational decision-maker
decides a solution to a problem by selecting the best of the candidate solutions.
A similar optimization principle is at the base of the homo oeconomicus axioms
used in classic economic theory: agents are self-interested, maximizing their utility
functions. The initial infinite potential ascriptions are then reduced to a small list of
(economically) rational ones.
There are many ways in which one can frame criticisms against those assump-
tions, and explain how we should deal with the boundedness of human rationality:
decision problems in the real world are always potentially too complex, making it
prohibitive and practically impossible to perform maximization over all possible
alternatives. Heuristics, rules and procedures emerge as a natural response of the
agent to unpredictable errors in selecting the best solution. Heiner (1983) identifies
the root of this general phenomenon in the gap between an agents competence at
solving a problem and the difficulty of a decision problem in an environment, called
the C-D gap.
Heiner convincingly argues that for big C-D gaps an agent will generally over
time perform more effectively and efficiently by following simple rules rather than
attempting to maximize. A good chess player will for instance tend towards playing
specific routine openings to capitalize on his experience in the types of games that
develop from those openings, and get more creative in the middle and late game,
even though standard interpretations of rationality would suggest that the best move
becomes easier to guess late in the game as complexity decreases. In social settings
this tends to result in institutionalization of social interactions, as the actors involved
all perform better if the interactions are predictable to the extent they can be. There
are for instance a number of valid ways to conclude a sales transaction, but a super-
market will accommodate only one of them to structure interactions and reduce the
cognitive load imposed on participants. The result is that agent engages in a kind of
ecological niche construction (Bardone, 2011), associating relatively simple sets of
rules to social roles he might play in interactions with an environment, dependent
on what model he chooses for that environment.
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2.5 Social Intelligence as Compressing Behaviour
Simplifying, an agent and an environment could be modeled as programs that ex-
change symbols, with the environment sending reward signals to the agent in reac-
tion to its output signals.
Hutter (2006) defines intelligent behaviour in terms of an agent’s expected re-
ward in an environment (and universal intelligence in terms of all conceivable en-
vironments). The agent has the task to predict which outputs will maximize the
future reward. This general formulation covers for instance game playing (where
one’s competence is determined by the ability to predict the opponent’s moves) and
question-answering (predict the answer that will be rewarded). To be competent at
prediction, the agent essentially has to guess the program that its environment (or
opponent) runs. This is the same problem as compression of data: to discover a small
program (the prediction mechanism) that reproduces the body of data (the symbols
from the environment). This explains the establishment of the Hutter prize: a reward
for setting a new standard for compressing a large body of data: being able to com-
press well is closely related to acting intelligently. A similar intuition is formalized
by algorithmic information theory, synthesized by the expression “understanding is
compression” (Chaitin, 2005).
As a concept of intelligence, intelligence as compression is a powerful abstrac-
tion, but also one that has clear limitations from an ecological point of view (Dowe,
Herna´ndez-Orallo, and Das, 2011). Firstly, it does not account for the origin of the
reward mechanism. In lossy compression schemes (in audio and video compression)
we for instance discard part of the data from the environment as noise rather than
signal to be reproduced, because it does not matter (i.e. no reward is given) to the
human viewer. Without such an external reference, we however have no account of
how our intelligent agent makes the distinction between useless and useful data, and
always compressing everything is not an ecologically valid approach to dealing with
the cognitive limitations of an intelligent agent in a complex environment. In other
words, a theory of intelligence should be dealing with Heiner’s C-D gap.
The second limitation deals with social environments, and is in this context ob-
vious. The intelligence as compression concept accounts for learning by induction
from examples, but not for social learning through interaction with other agents. It
cannot account for shared vocabulary between agents (i.e. ontology), not with argu-
mentation, and not with the exchange of instructions and rules between agents. Any
account of these omissions would need to explain how agents keep their programs
sufficiently similar to exchange pieces of them with other agents.
Nevertheless, the core observation of the intelligence as compression approach
remains of interest: Confronted with an environment, or with another agent, intel-
ligence involves, among other things, the ability to select or create of a program
that can be ascribed to that environment or agent, or to select or create a correlative
program to drive rewarding interactions with that agent or environment.
10 Alexander Boer and Giovanni Sileno
2.6 Specifying Intentional Agents
The traditional AI perspective internalizes the intentional stance and considers
agents as intelligent systems, entities performing certain actions in order to achieve
certain goals, depending on their knowledge. Consider for instance the uncompro-
mising external perspective towards agents taken by Newell in his seminal paper on
the knowledge level 1982. Knowledge and goals are ascribed to an agent to explain
its behaviour, and are separable from the structures and mechanisms that create that
behaviour. In a sense, Newell proposes that the key problem of Artificial Intelli-
gence is to create models of observed agent behaviour within the bounds of some
design constraints, a model of deliberation loosely referred to as the principle of
rationality. The question of how to reproduce mechanisms that create the behaviour
is secondary, and in practice often easier if the design problem is well-defined, and
the goals of the agent are easy to identify (as long as one is focusing on things like
chess, or recognizing faces for that matter).
Considering goals as (a kind of) desires, this approach can be aligned to the
traditional philosophical account of practical rationality, based on a belief-desire
architecture (BD). Bratman (1987) convincingly argued against such two-parameter
characterizations. In principle, a BDI framework allows us to consider that agents
may have conflicting, inconsistent desires (e.g. to eat the chocolate and to follow a
weight-loss plan), but those that are eventually selected for the actual conduct have
to be consistent; it is this selection, reified as intention, that captures the deliberative
aspect of agency.
However, for the reasons exposed above, in contrast to the traditional view of
deliberative agent—according to which agents take rational decisions by weighing
reasons—one could rather start from an interpretative basis, considering that agents
might reproduce already established courses of action (or scripts). For their ex-post
nature, scripts reify deliberations already occurred. Intentions, as commitments to-
wards courses of actions, are then reduced again to low-order volitional states se-
lected by higher-order desires in accordance to the abilities and knowledge ascribed
to the agent.
Evidently, what is obtained through an interpretative standpoint can be remapped
in generative terms, i.e., entering the agent’s mind, the same mental states can be
used as the drivers for his conduct. It is to satisfy his intents that the agent behaves in
a certain way. It is unimportant to acknowledge whether such mental states actually
exist or are epiphenomena of other unconscious activities of the brain. The principle
of responsibility in our legal systems is based on the assumption that such mental
states are significant to reason about human behaviour (cf. (Sileno, Saillenfest, and
Dessalles, 2017)).
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2.7 Agentive Positions
In previous works ((Sileno, Boer, and Engers, 2015), extended in (Sileno, 2016,
Ch. 7)) we recognized four primitive categories required to specify the behaviour of
an agent: commitments, expectations, affordances, susceptibilities (CAES). Infor-
mally, they roughly correspond to what the agent wants, what he believes, what (he
perceives) he is able to do, and what he is disposed to react to. Any instance of one
of these classes is a position that the agent takes with respect to the environment.
Commitments, as a category, include all motivational states. There may be com-
mitments which are acceptable for the agent (desires), commitments which are
preferred by the agent, and finally commitments which are selected by the agent
(intents), eventually triggering an intention leading a certain course of action.
The introduction of prioritization at the level of preferences serves to solve pos-
sible inconsistencies, allowing a conflict-free selection of the desires to which the
agent may commit as intents. From a generative perspective, commitment can be
interpreted as agentive dispositions having enough stability to drive action. In
this sense, all living beings, even the most primitive, are functionally provided
with the commitment to survive. On the other hand, we have also to take into
account that not all reasons for action necessarily refer to concrete objectives:
e.g. desires promoting values strongly influence the behaviour of agents, but at a
deeper level in the rationalization.
Expectations reflect the situatedness of the subject in the world. What the agent
expects from the world is what he believes the world is, actually and potentially.
The actual category mirrors the traditional definition of beliefs. The potential cat-
egory identifies what, according to the agent, the world may bring about under
certain conditions, and corresponds to the usual meaning associated with expec-
tation. For the intelligence as compression hypothesis, expectations cover the
role of program that the environment runs, used by the agent to maximize the
available rewards for the given commitments.
Affordances (or abilities) can be seen as an opportunities of action—possibilities
of the agent to adopt certain behaviours, in certain conditions, to achieve certain
results. Affordances interact with commitments to define which behaviour the
agent will eventually select.
Susceptibilities are attitudes specifying the reactive aspect of agency; an agent is
susceptible to a certain event if he exhibits some reaction to its occurrence, at the
epistemic or motivational level.
2.8 Reactive Architectures
What is the role of these components in reasoning? Theoretically, the simplest re-
flex agent is specified by a single reactive rule: at the occurrence of a certain condi-
tion, he performs a certain action. Diagrammatically, his behavior builds upon three
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components: a rule (R), an ability (A) associated to the action required by R and a
susceptibility (S) associated to the triggering condition activating the rule.
A
R
S
Suppose the rule R to be a reactive rule of the type “if perception then do ac-
tion”; using the previous elements, the susceptibility S would enable the transmis-
sion of perception, the ability A would enable the performance of action. If R, A,
S hold, if perception is captured, the action is performed. More in general, R may
also be instantiated by a non-conflicting rule-base; in this case A and S could stand
as sets of abilities/susceptibilities associated to the rules in R (the diagram makes
abstraction of the individual associations). R may be also a mathematical formula (a
transformational rule); in this case S denotes the ability to collect the required input
parameters, and A the ability to compute the expression specified by R.
Increasing the complexity of the world to be taken into account to activate R—as
for instance memory aspects, that cannot be perceived in the environment in real-
time—we need to introduce a model of the world (M), i.e. a simplified representa-
tion adequately interpreting the sensory inputs.
A
R
S
M
This architecture is however opaque for providing reasons to action, because
what links M and R in driving action is a mere syntaxic relation. In contrast, if
we posit the rule in terms of a commitment (C) to a condition to be satisfied, the
minimal model triggering the action corresponds to the negation of the belief (E) that
the satisfying condition does hold. This new architecture would provide intuitive
reasons to explain behaviour: the agent acts because there is a conflict between what
he wants and what (he thinks) it holds. However, three dependencies still need to be
added for a plausible agent architecture:
• enactive perception (from the set of active commitments, amongst which C, to
S): the perceptual experience has to be entrenched with the course of action to
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which the agent is committed, mostly to be ready to anticipate potential (usually
negative) outcomes by adequate monitoring;
• affordance activation (from the set of active expectations, amongst which E, to
A): because the epistemic conflict is specified at higher-level, an additional in-
formational channel is needed to contextualize the capabilities of the agent to the
current situation;
• affordance inhibition (from a commitment C’, stronger than C, to A): a certain
action may produce consequences which are in conflict with stronger desires; in
this case, even if perceived, the associated affordance is inhibited to prevent the
triggering of the action.
The resulting diagram is as follows (red arrows are dependencies building upon
conflicts, blue circle-headed arrows are inhibitors, densely dotted arrows refer to
sets of active commitments/expectactions):
C' > < E'
A
C E
S
For symmetry, the figure reports with sparsely dotted arrows a negative impact of
desire on the creation of belief, and the inhibition of susceptibility due to a stronger
epistemic commitment. Interestingly, those links capture distortions actually ob-
servable in human reasoning, as tunnel vision, denial of evidence, wishful thinking,
etc. They are distortions because they reduce the agent’s grounding to perceptual
evidence, and therefore they limit the possibility of epistemic alignment with other
agents with a different set of commitments.
The analysis should be also extended to the negative counterparts: e.g. a negative
commitment towards T is the desire of T not holding, a negative affordance is the
ability of inhibiting a certain outcome to occur by performing a certain action, etc.
It can be shown that these components activate different reasoning constructs, and
therefore provide a different characterization and response. Interestingly, this is in
accordance with the observation of Mercier and Sperber (2011) about the difference
between pro and against arguing behaviours.
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3 Institutions and Collective Agency
3.1 Going Internal: Control vs Ecological Structures
The external point of view is basis for interpretation, the internal one is for design.
In social systems the implementation layer consists of agents, therefore design cor-
responds to deciding structural arrangements that enable those agents to form robust
organizations in order to achieve higher-order goals. The agents will operate through
a mix of cooperation, coordination, and competition in problem solving, in all cases
with limited information exchange and limited commitment to shared vocabulary
and rules.
Evidently, by distributing the (operational, computational) charge to networks of
independent agents, we are naturally evolving from control structures to ecologi-
cal structures. The difference between the two categories is best visualized by the
distinction (originating with Deleuze and Guattari (1980), recently revisited by De
Landa (2006)) of the totality vs assemblage conceptualizations of wholes, summa-
rized in the following table:
Totality Assemblage
organic composition (e.g. heart in
body)
ecological coupling (e.g. symbiosis)
components specified by relations of
interiority: all their properties are
manifest
components specified by relations of
exteriority: only part of their properties
is manifest
components exist only as part of the
system
components exist even in absence of
system
dependencies logically necessary dependencies contextually obligatory
failures compromise the system failures irritate the system
The passage from totality to assemblage requires several conceptual steps. For
the sake of the argument, let us image we start from a monolithic software imple-
menting an IT service, made up of several internal modules. The first step is adding
redundancy in the system, i.e. components potentially providing similar functions.
If there is only one module that implements a required function for the IT service
to run and this module fails, the application will stop working properly. If there are
a number of modules that might be invoked providing overlapping functions, the
service resilience will generally increase and the problem will become rather one
of an economic nature—i.e. of settling on an adequate resource distribution strat-
egy amongst these modules. However, the IT service example still considers a core
module that is dispatching resources to the others, depending on its requirements
(just like MapReduce (Dean and Ghemawat, 2008) for service resilience relies on a
scheduler allocating resources). As a second step this constraint need to be relaxed.
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A pure assemblage has no core module: there is no co-coordinator putting pref-
erential requirements in the foreground. (In nature, maintenance functions emerge
as a selection effect: assemblages not able to sustain themselves disappear.) Third,
components of an assemblage exist independently of whether the assemblage holds
or not. In other words, components of a totality are fully specified by their actual
properties within the system (relations of interiority), whereas components of an
assemblage have dispositions which are not amongst those manifest in the context
of that specific assemblage (relations of exteriority).
Considering the components of the assemblage as agents, whose intent satis-
faction counts as reward obtained by the environment, we can draw the following
general templates:
• competition: agents are committed to the same target, but its satisfaction by one
produces a (physical or symbolic) scarcity for the others;
• cooperation: agents have dependent commitments, i.e. the satisfaction of one
agent’s intent is required for or facilitates the satisfaction of another agent’s in-
tent; symmetric dependencies are at the base of mutualism and enable mainte-
nance functions (as in the symbiosis example);
• coordination: a structured mechanism (resulting from an individual or collective
agency) distributes rewards and punishment to the agents specifically to obtain
higher-order goals.
A discriminating factor between cooperation and coordination schemes can be
the presence of explicit signalization. For instance, symbiosis exists even without
communications.
3.2 The Central Role of Failures
Institutions are instead a prototypical example of mechanisms of coordination: they
build upon symbolic means, and form an infrastructure providing rewards and pun-
ishments (the famous carrots and sticks) to social actors, modifying those available
from the non-institutional environment. Note how competition aspects are for the
most extra-institutional (e.g. the choice of a sale price in a market). Focusing in
particular on the legal system as an institution, its practical function is to intervene
when an (institutional) failure supposedly occurs in social interactions, i.e. when
the institutional expectations of one of the parties involved aren’t met. From a func-
tional point of, ex-post judicial interpretations are meant to make explicit the norma-
tive positions of the parties before the failure, and then to associate the institutional
response if the failure is confirmed, building upon the sources of law. Normative
sources are then used as reasons to enrich behavioural models ascribed of the par-
ties.
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3.3 Hohfeldian Prisms
Hohfeld’s analysis of fundamental legal concepts (Hohfeld, 1913) starts from a sim-
ilar interpretative consideration and captures two distinct dimensions—the obliga-
tive (or deontic) dimension and the potestative (or capacitive) dimension—of the
legal relations holding between two social actors that are bound by legal provisions.
The resulting framework brings two crucial innovations.
First, the consideration that concrete normative relations cannot be expressed on
the mere basis of deontic modalities. For operational purposes, it is crucial to make
explicit which party is the addressee of the normative proposition and which party
is the beneficiary, i.e. whose interests are protected or promoted (cf. the teleolog-
ical aspect highlighted by Sartor (2006)). Thus, the notion of claim embodies the
idea of right as the protection of an interest via a corresponding duty. A privilege
corresponds instead to the absence of duty, and when it holds the other party has no-
claim to advance. By observing the intuitive correspondence of duty with obligation
and privilege with permission (in the common meaning of faculty, not the formal
one), we added a negative dimension to the traditional Hohfeldian square, obtain-
ing the first Hohfeldian prism (A, E, Y are the positions of the deontic triangle of
contrariety) (Sileno, Boer, and Engers, 2014):
dutyclaim 
privilegeno-claim
E
A
Y
beneficiary addressee
+
–
right to 
performance 
right to 
protection against
forb
 faculty
obl
The second innovation is the explicit consideration of the dimension of insti-
tutional change, centered around the notion of power. Hohfeld insists also on the
characterization of institutional power with volitional control, that is, with inten-
tionality. A person holding such a power has the institutional ability to deliberately
alter legal relations (e.g. transfer of ownership) by performing certain acts. Rather
than using terms of addressee and beneficiary when considering the action, the two
parties can be distinguished as (potential) performer (enacting the power) and re-
cipient (suffering from the enactment). Correlative to power, liability means being
subjected to that power, while the opposite immunity means to be kept institutionally
untouched by the other party performing the action (who, in turn, is a position of
disability). As before, introducing a negative dimension we unveil the second Ho-
hfeldian prism, discovering the neglected positions of negative liability and negative
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power, relevant to contrast institutions (for an extended analysis of the Hohfeldian
prisms, see (Sileno, 2016, Ch. 4)):
liabilitypower 
immunitydisability
E
A
Y
performer recipient
right to be
followed along
"right" to be not
followed along
forb ...
faculty to 
follow along
obl ..
+
–
The visual representation given by the prisms (or squares, as in the original con-
tribution) makes explicit the symmetry and duality of the relations between two par-
ties. Focusing on a specific perspective, as for instance that of the addressee, three
(two, without the negative attitudes) positions, i.e. points on a virtual dimension—
are available to describe where that party stands. This position is strictly linked to
the position of the other party. One may think of those diagrams as a game board in
which when one player moves, he moves both checkers at the same time (correla-
tivity axiom). Thus, the difference between, for example, duty and claim is just one
of point of view, as they describe the same binding.
3.4 Interface between Normative and Agentive Positions
At a theoretical level, the four agentive categories of commitment, expectation, af-
fordance and susceptibility can be put in direct correspondence with the four nor-
mative categories duty, claim, power and liability, interpreting the environment as
the correlative party to the agent (Sileno, Boer, and Engers, 2015). The distinction
can be traced as one of intrinsic vs extrinsic attitudes of one agent’s behaviour. So-
cial norms (including legal norms) provide reasons for the agent—by attempting
to influence the rewards of the environment—to promote or demote certain action-
selections in his conduct (via obligations and prohibitions), or even create the pos-
sibility of certain action-selections (via institutional power).
Let us divide all institutional knowledge in class-norm (N) and token-fact (F)
types of components. Modifying rewards of the environment, they supposedly play
a role in the expectation category within one agent’s reasoning. Intuitively, to fa-
cilitate normative alignment between agents, norms should be as much as possible
accessible, and therefore require a public medium of transmission. The case of in-
stitutional facts is a bit different; to protect sensible information, they should be in
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principle shared only on a institutional coordination basis. However, this distinction
is not so strong as it seems: the universal ambition of the modern rule of law can be
seen rather as a special case, consequence of the large base of addressees; compa-
nies do not necessarily want to share their policies widely, and social groups may
have unique customs not explained to outsiders, with the effect of facilitating the
distinction of in-group and out-of-group interactions.
We can redraw the reactive architecture presented above, adding these institu-
tional elements, and making explicit the type of transformational powers at stake:
• directive power, of bringing the commitment C in action;
• operational power, of performing the action to achieve a certain goal, by means
of the ability A;
• enabling power, of activating the ability A (cf. the dual disabling power);
• regulatory power, of transforming the individual commitment C to the social
commitment N;
• publishing power, of reifying the norm N on an artifact publicly accessible;
• interpretative power, of interpreting observations, producing beliefs and expec-
tations E;
• monitoring power, of perceiving a certain input, by means of a susceptibility S;
• attention power, of activating the susceptibility S (cf. the dual diverting power);
• declarative power, of transforming the individual belief E to a social fact F;
• registering power, of reifying the fact F on an artifact.
They are illustrated by the following diagram (dashed arrows):
C
A S
E
FN
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power
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power
interpretative
power
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power
directive
power
operational
power
attention 
power
enabling
power
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power
publishing 
power
Note that norms and institutional facts play a role at an epistemic level first.
Furthermore, all powers require to be activated by specific actions, and therefore
their applications hide a commitment, activating in turn directive power, operational
power, etc.
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3.5 Distributed Agency
Hypothesizing that the functions illustrated in such a reactive architecture are cor-
rect, we should find them independently from whether the agency is implemented
in a control or an ecological system. In effect, one can recognize the basis for the
famous trias politica: the executive, legislative and judiciary branches can be seen
as concentrating on themselves the directive, regulative and interpretative powers of
a collective agency. The principle of separation of powers can be explained as aim-
ing to maintain the balances present in the standard reasoning architecture: N puts
constraints on E, but E has the power to re-contextualize them by producing F, in
turn inhibiting/enabling the abilities A available for C. Finally, even if C could be in
principle transformed in N, N contains also previous decisions, taken by supposedly
different power-holders, plausibly establishing constraints on C’s regulative maneu-
vers. If the same actor holds both, e.g. the directive and interpretative powers, there
is a short-circuit in the architecture because interpretation could be forced to enable
this actor’s commitments, rather than respecting those consolidated in the norms.
Most interventions of the judiciary occur on an asynchronous basis: the triggering
event is a social actor (the plaintiff) that supposedly experienced an institutional
failure and goes to the court. This means that the monitoring power is left to each
social participants. Media outlets are instead characterized as actors that (generally
compete to) hold attention power.
The increasing presence of global online platforms centralizing socio-economic
transactions, as well as the agglomeration of institutional administrative repositories
is also opening possibilities of upstream monitoring by the entities having access to
such information. De Mulder and Meijer (2012) have argued for an extension of
the principle of separation of powers to a tetras politica, including these potential
monitoring branches. The point makes sense, but, looking on our diagrams, it should
be enriched also by an analysis on registering power, probably the next frontier of
innovation if smart contracts or related technologies (e.g. block-chain) will enter
into the institutional operational cycle.
3.6 Maintenance Functions
Although we have recognized in collective agencies functions ascribed to a single
agent, we have not explained how this is actually possible. For systemic mainte-
nance, we expect the existence of some enforcement mechanism, that is able to
guide and maintain to a good extent individuals in principle independent to form
an assemblage. (Consider again the symbiosis example, the contextual obligation
of interaction is a consequence of the positive reward of such an organization, with
respect to absence of interaction.)
Enforcement actions generalize this principle, as they supposedly provide an in-
stitutional response to failures and strengthen the general compliance using rewards
and sanctions, but the enforcement is not necessarily due to mere legal mechanisms,
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but also to social or physical dispositions (e.g. regulations of right-hand/left-hand
traffic are issued in the presence of a sort of natural enforcement: not complying
with the correct driving direction would have direct and possibly terrible conse-
quences). However, legal transactions have the crucial advantage of putting in the
foreground explicit protections to the risks of lack of coordination between the par-
ties.
The general evolution of contemporary enforcement practices—observable not
only in modern legal systems, but also in school, parenting and informal groupings—
has been nicely synthesized by Dari-Mattiacci and Geest (2013) as “the rise of car-
rots and the decline of sticks”. The authors propose a theory explaining this ten-
dency. In short, from an economic perspective, punishment-based systems are more
efficient in simple settings, i.e. when the burden of compliance can be well specified
and distributed amongst the involved parties. Reward-based systems, on the other
hand, are more efficient when the regulator has difficulties specifying the burden, or
the burden is not well distributed amongst the social participants. As modern soci-
eties become more complex, heterogeneity of contexts and tasks is increasing, and
so reward-based systems are becoming more common.
At first glance, we could write any contract either in carrot-style or in stick-style
and they would be identical, at least from an algebraic point of view. However,
experiments conducted in behavioral economics on similar formulations found out
that the two rephrasings are not the same (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Even
at the analytical level, Dari-Mattiaci and Geest observe that there is an intrinsic
difference due to the monitoring component: if monitoring is not perfect, the two
formulations are different because a party that is not monitored in a carrot-based
system counts as being non-compliant; whereas, in a stick-based system, it counts as
being compliant. In practice, as observed by Boer (2014), a reward regime assumes
that most people are non-compliant; a punishment regime assumes that most people
are compliant. Boer proposes then the following evidence criteria to decide whether
an enforcement system is based on carrots or on sticks:
• a reward regime requires the production of evidence of compliance,
• a punishment regime requires the production of evidence of non-compliance.
These criteria switch the attention from internal, subjective aspects relative to the
parties to external aspects specified in regulations. Interestingly, these are related
to the burden of proof, usually distributed amongst claimants (for evidence of non-
compliance) and addressees (for evidence of compliance).
4 Pluralism as Ecological Diversity
4.1 Epistemological Pluralism
Interestingly, the dichotomy totality vs assemblage captures also the distinction be-
tween formal and informal conceptual (symbolic) systems. The difficulty of con-
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straining natural language in formal semantics is well known. The regularity of as-
sociation of linguistic terms to a certain interpretation is a consequence of a relative
regularity of the environment, of the perceptual apparatus, of the knowledge and of
the commitments of the locutors—but a change within one of those aspects might
entail a change in the associations as well. Taking into account this phenomenon
means to accept epistemological pluralism.
Furthermore, beyond inter-agent pluralism (agents, for being independent, do not
share the same knowledge), there is also an intra-agent pluralism to be considered,
due to ontological stratification (Boer, 2009). For instance, a road may be seen as a
curved line while looking at directions on a map, as a surface while driving, or as a
volume while putting asphalt to build it. The alternative cuts, as with the intentional
stance, are due to the different properties of the entity which are relevant to the task
in focus. Any alignment of vocabularies or ontologies cannot be successful without
an adequate analysis of the underlying commitments to the domain.
Normative systems, which are defined symbolically, prototypically suffer from
this problem, because the possible contexts in which they might operate cannot be
predicted in advance, but at the same time, they can also be seen as a prototypical
solution to the problem, because they attempt to consolidate goals in higher-order,
abstract form, leaving the specification of further contextualization at need.
4.2 Normative Pluralism
But there is another level of assemblage to be taken into account for normativity:
agents belong to a single normative system only in a ideal case. Think of all the rules
and norms, written and unwritten, that we encounter in daily life. At home we did
certain chores because we at some point agreed to a distribution of them, or perhaps
simply because they are expected of us. We followed both traffic rules, and informal
driving etiquette, on the roads while traveling to and from work. We parked the car
following rules and directions, greeted colleagues following social conventions, and
perhaps followed directions about where not to smoke or not to drink our coffee and
where to discard our paper coffee cup. Finally we are writing this chapter following
grammar and spelling rules, instructions about structuring chapters, and conventions
about citation and plagiarism, working to meet a deadline.
These norms belong to different types, and we recognize them as part of different
complex systems of norms. Some are based in law, others in social conventions of
society at large, in social conventions of the academic field, those of a particular
building, or even of a small private circle. Any of these norms we may have noticed
or not noticed, regarded or disregarded, and followed or violated, consciously or
unconsciously. And for the most part we hardly thought about them, which is, when
we do think about them, really amazing, since normative pluralism does pose two
really interesting questions (see e.g. Twining (2010)).
The first question is: how do we notice norms, and detect and resolve conflicts
between pairs of norms as they arise?
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When two norms are in conflict they are so because they either:
• disaffirm each other, i.e. appear to label the same intention as both strongly per-
mitted and not permitted, or
• appear to require of us that we adopt two intentions that jointly are inconsistent
with our beliefs and hence cannot be executed jointly if our beliefs are correct,
for instance if we ought to have our cake and eat it.
From the point of view of the norms we might state that norms may be grouped
into a normative order, which is an institutionalized system of norms aimed at or-
dering social relationships between members of a community or group. Conflicts
between these norms are largely ironed out within the system of norms, and norms
for determining applicability and priority of norms may determine the outcome of
new conflicts. This is however only possible to the extent that agreed upon norms
on conflict resolution and prioritization can be established within the community or
group, noticing applicability of norms is not itself the overriding concern, and the
outcomes of the conflict resolution process remain acceptable to the members of the
community, i.e. the right norms are applied.
4.3 Value Pluralism
The second question is: how do we measure how norms perform overall if they are
to be effective in a plurality of norm environments?
Recalling that systems of norms range from the public, with universal appeal,
to the most private, the problem of measuring norm performance is relevant at all
levels of granularity, from an intra-agent and inter-agent perspective. The individ-
ual agent, and the organization, and whole communities form judgments about the
performance of individual norms, and the problem of forming opinions about in-
dividual norms in a plurality of norm environments is rather ill-defined if it is the
norm environment itself that frames what rational action is.
One might naively think of this problem as a quantitative one, of measuring over-
all levels of compliance. From the perspective of the values served by norms this is
however typically ill-advised. A norm performs well if it works, or is complied with,
in those environments where it is useful, and doesn’t work, or is violated, in those
environments where its value is outweighed by more important values served by
other, competing norms that (should) take precedence. As such, overall compliance
levels do not necessarily mean something, if they are not properly scoped to a niche
in which norms should be complied with.
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4.4 Pluralisms and Social Niches
A general pattern could be traced at this point. Intra-agent epistemological pluralism
emerges from simplifying the agent-environment coupling relatively to functional
niches, determining the explicit articulation of several agent-environment couplings.
Inter-agent pluralism aggregates those articulations, and the commitments exploit-
ing them, resulting in a set of agent-roles available within a social niche. Normative
and value pluralism can be seen as components of the previous ones, aggregating re-
spectively social coordination (institutional) and reward model aspects. Other pos-
sible inflections are political pluralism, necessary base for democracy; and legal
pluralism, a special case of normative pluralism, necessary requirement for juris-
diction in international matters.
In other words, pluralisms come together with accepting an ecological view of
social systems: they mirror the diversity (of aspects) of the social niches available
within a society, at a certain point in time. This implies that rules can be understood
and modeled only within the context of social roles. All effort to capture regularities,
rules or associated epiphenomena without considering the niche that is using them
is going to fail, because as soon as the relative distribution of niches in society
changes, the model foundations will change too.
5 Discussion
5.1 Institutional Metaphors for Large-Scale Distributed AI
With the increasing use of block-chain technology, of smart contracts, of the Internet
of Things and, more in general, of distributed, computational, possibly autonomous,
systems, it is relevant to apply the previous conceptualizations to assess how much
of the institutional mechanisms identified in the legal domain have a correspondence
in computational social systems.
Despite the name, “smart contracts” do not embody any problem-solving method,
nor are specified by assigning normative positions to parties as in usual contracts.
Their main innovation, as with the block-chain, is the distributed ledger, used both
for “contract” publication and for registration of the related transactions, removing
the requirement of a explicit maintainer (e.g. a bank, a public administration, a no-
tary, etc.). They are creating the basis for a potential infrastructural centralization of
registration power. Unfortunately, by collapsing normative functions to the imple-
mentation layer, these artifacts are fundamentally opaque to users. Second, they do
not enable architecturally the negative feedback of interpretative power on directive
power for novel or exceptional contexts not taken into account at design time. This
heavily undermines the reasonableness of the solution for institutional operational-
izations. In spirit, they do not differ from paperclip maximizers (Bostrom, 2003).
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In recent years, many efforts have been directed towards the development of se-
cure operating systems. Traditionally, most implementations builds upon solutions
in the spirit of access control lists (ACL), i.e. mapping each user and object to a
series of operations allowed to perform on it (e.g. read, write, execute) (Ferraiolo,
Barkley, and Kuhn, 1992). These permissions are usually called also privileges, or
authorizations; but at closer inspection, it is a conflated version of the homonym
Hohfeldian position. Without such a permission, the user is disabled to perform that
action, not prohibited. For their dematerialized content, computers are not so dif-
ferent from institutional systems: they both builds upon symbol-processing mech-
anisms. In this sense, writing a file is not a physical operation, but an institutional
operation, and so, to perform it the user is required to have the correspondent power.
Capability-based security models are implicitly based on this, using communicable
tokens for authorization known as capabilities (e.g. Levy, 1984). The principle of
least privilege (or least authorization) requires that capabilities are assigned only
within the actual purpose of the application. However, considering authorization
merely as power carries additional concerns. In actual socio-legal settings, the most
common usage of permission of A is when the agent has the (usually physical)
power to perform A, but is prohibited from doing it. More in general, permission
is needed because power has a too low granularity to capture higher-order effects.
For instance, even if a single action per se may be allowed (enabled), that action in
a course of actions, or together with other actions, may bring about unauthorized
results (consider e.g. denial of service (DoS) types of attacks exploiting trusted ap-
plications). Consider, as an additional example of engineering “blindness” to social
semantics, the endless discussions about of what fragment is logic to be offered for
knowledge representation in the semantic web, mostly focusing around computabil-
ity and halting problem vs. the fact that, as soon as you open up an interface to the
outside world through a SPARQL interface, the system can be trivially brought to
its knees by a DoS attack regardless of the fragment of logic adopted.
Evidently, failure cases extracted from ex-post evaluations can be used effectively
for monitoring potential preparations of known schemes, but the actual problem,
resolved in human societies by using deontic directives, is to specify principled
reasons as a basis or anchor to qualify new types of failures within the existing
normative framework.
Focusing now on AI methods, the most interesting results obtained in these last
years comes from an hybrid application of deep learning methods with reinforce-
ment learning (e.g. AlphaGo, (Silver et al., 2016)). Also genetic algorithms can be
interpreted as issued through evolutionary reinforcement. For the nature of the tasks,
most reinforcements can be associated to a centralized reward system, providing the
agent with something positive/negative (that he wouldn’t have had otherwise) if he
attains an outcome qualified positively/negatively. These are only two amongst the
six (primitive) possible figures of reward/punishment regimes that can be identified
in institutional systems (see (Sileno, 2016, section 9.5)). But there is a more pro-
found problem that undermines their generalization towards less specialized prob-
lems: the need of specifying clear-cut reward/punishment functions.
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In effect, AI researchers and practitioners (and in general problem-solvers) tend
to think that the identification of goals is the easy part—and how to get to these
targets the hard part. However, when conceiving applications that are required to
adapt to the user, or to the social environment, this presumption rapidly collapses,
and couldn’t be otherwise for at least three reasons: for the many possible config-
urations of preferences between social participants, for such configurations being
highly contextual, and for most preferences to be tacit.
The main weakness of contemporary AI lies in trying to capitalize too much on
optimizing and reasoning about the evidence and options for action (generate & test
paradigm) within known requirements, constraints and problem formulation, rather
than looking into underlying phenomena of niche construction and adaptiveness,
and finding requirements as related to social roles. Deciding to target social roles,
rather than formulating requirements on an individual basis, follows from Heiner’s
theory and is cognitively supported by the observation that also humans actually
perform better at deontic reasoning than evidential reasoning (Mercier and Sperber,
2011), and acquire this ability earlier (as small children).
Interestingly, the AI & Law discipline can be thought as originating from revers-
ing the general AI attitude, by focusing strongly on the conflict between goals, and
the mechanisms by which we acquire and select them (normativity, or, even more
deeply, values). Capitalizing on this experience, even considering the automatic dis-
covery of ecological niches too ambitious, one could still aim for the automated
design of compositions of social roles meant to achieve certain given requirements.
The core problem in obtaining such construction would be of detecting and solv-
ing the internal role conflicts, and doing so by internalizing pluralism (normative,
value, epistemological). A critical part in the design would lie in settling adequate
data and knowledge roles, the ones which carry data and knowledge between be-
havioural niches. An improvident centralization of data, for instance, might enable
the utilization of the collected information for purposes non-intended by the data-
providing agents. This unveils the need of a principle of least information calibrated
to the adequateness of reasons for access to information (dependent on the social
role attributed to the requestor and thus the social context), rather than a token-based
principle of least privilege (dependent on the requestor).
5.2 AI Techniques for Running Institutions
In the current globalization trend, all socio-economic actors (private individuals,
private companies, NGOs, and public institutions) become more and more active at
an international scale, and institutional interdependencies pass from exceptional to
normal operative conditions. Operating concurrently within different legal jurisdic-
tions, these actors are subject to an ever-changing compound of rules (e.g. national
provisions, international treaties, standards), whose complexity naturally increases
with the number of international activities maintained. This carries risks of misalign-
ment, which may lead such actors to suffer enforcement actions and institutions to
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suffer failures. On the other hand, as their activities occur at international level,
those actors have the possibility to establish practices—for instance, aiming to re-
duce the burden of compliance with environmental, labor, or privacy regulations; or
to implement schemes of tax avoidance, tax evasion, or money laundering—which
are not yet (or impossible to be) recognized by formal institutions at national level.
From a theoretical perspective, increase of complexity means an increase of the
C-D gap for the agents, and therefore a pressure towards establishing simpler, more
manageable operational rules, at the potential expense of the normative elaboration
conducted upfront and of the diversity of cases that may occur, and that would in-
stead require, to serve the citizens’ interests, a dedicated response. In this context,
AI, and in particular AI & Law, could provide methodological and computational
support for consolidating the rational functioning of collective agencies.
Beyond classic problems-solving tasks for operational purposes (e.g. planning,
scheduling), here we refer in particular to methods supporting higher-order func-
tions of rational agency as the one highlighted above.
In current practices, one can observe little attention to pluralisms within organiza-
tional settings, caused by focusing on implementation and optimization of “normal”
provision patterns—the so-called happy flow. Consequently, even if presumption of
compliance utilized at the rule design phase is generally untested, patterns of failure
are put outside the scope of attention. Thus, even if numerically negligible, failures
in service delivery absorb proportionally more and more resources, and result in a
more complicated experience for the service consumer (the anecdotal problems of
machine bureaucracy, cf. (Seddon, 2008)). Symptomatic of this situation are un-
realistic ways to quantify and measure performance, little attention to the systemic
meaning of failures, and no implementation of a systematic diagnosis process that
would reduce the operational burden (as for instance that presented in (Sileno, Boer,
and Engers, 2017)). On a par with this, there are excessive expectations about the
information that can be obtained from big data analysis, implausible because the
niches in which data is generated are completely neglected.
On the other hand, collective agencies risk to take an attitude of paralyzing real-
ism, when they put excessive attention on capturing pluralism in society matters at
high granularity, as they become unable of completing the aggregating requirements
phase necessary to proceed to the directive and then operational or regulative phase.
Both machine-bureaucracy and paralyzing-realism scenarios results from not set-
tling upon an adequate systematization of environmental modeling (too little, or too
much). The solution lies in establishing adequate networks in which to distribute
the burden of capturing social requirements and scenarios of non-compliance, to be
transmitted, maintained and processed for support to the design/development phase
and of the operational phases (e.g. with automatic model-based interpretation, in-
cluding diagnostics, see (Boer and Engers, 2011a,b; Sileno, 2016; Sileno, Boer, and
Engers, 2017)).
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5.3 Converging Opportunities
Despite current hopes, even introducing big data analytics methods, the qualitative
depth of the knowledge available to decision-makers of collective agencies cannot
substantially improve. Such value can be captured only by the introduction of more
principled modeling and simulation methods targeting social niches, together with
knowledge maintenance, refinement and alignment techniques. This choice would
have as a direct consequence a concrete reduction of the C-D gap, and then would
provide a strong support for the design of more intelligent—backed up by reasons
and better situated with respect to the environment—rules for organizations.
Current attention for privacy matters offers an interesting test-bench for the pre-
vious considerations, as it requires to model norms about information use in niches
and flows between niches (c.f. contextual integrity, (Nissenbaum, 2009)), to system-
atize attention to failures, and to adopt a diagnosis point of view towards organiza-
tions and organizational goals.
In the light of the conceptualizations presented in the previous sections, a start-
ing point for this innovation is a sufficiently rich way of describing and reasoning
about social roles, as for instance captured by Hohfeldian and CAES positions. Ac-
tually, because normative positions enter within the reasoning cycle as expectations,
CAES descriptions offer a complete frame within which we expect role players to
be “boundedly rational”, and for this reason they can be used to characterize the
problems—of modeling, design, planning, monitoring, diagnosis, assessment, see
e.g. (Breuker, 1994)—that the agents must solve in a certain social role, and the
knowledge resources they require for that.
The harder the problem (from a C-D gap perspective), the harder is to verify
as an observer that the agent is doing as expected, and for this reason the agent
will need to argue its choices to other participants in the environment to explain
that he acted correctly. Evidently, the agent in that role is biased in its information
collection by its CAES description requirements, and therefore, to correctly check
ex-post whether he took good decisions, we may need to rely for rationality at a
higher level on the dialectical process taking place between the agents. A typical so-
lution, compatible with Heiner’s theory of predictable behaviour, would be to come
up with an increasingly rigorous burden of proof protocol for justifying decisions.
If, on the other hand, performance can be easily scored (e.g. on recognizing faces,
for instance) the depth of the reasoning process to be articulated can be minimal.
This brings us to the design problem of deciding whether to utilize tacit knowl-
edge methods (e.g. based on statistics) or explicit knowledge methods. Evidently,
the first are for their nature (typically feed-forward) faster than the second. But there
is something more than performance at stake.
For Watson like systems, the results of the question-answering “race” amongst
competing agents are clear: the judge-user is supposed to know the answer, there
will be no requests about “why” that answer is correct. On similar lines, consider a
mobile phone unlocking application based on face recognition. On the other hand,
when a diagnostic device settles on the conclusion “the patient has the appendicitis”,
it is natural for the user to demand why, expecting reasons that are acceptable to
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him. Similarly, a public administration cannot (or at least shouldn’t) deny e.g. a
parking license or citizenship without explaining why. The social role demanded of
the intelligent agents in the two types of applications is different, and this difference
is at the root of the recent calls for explainable AI (Core et al., 2006). When AI
devices have social relevance, they cannot neglect to provide reasons (determined
by their role) for their functioning.
To conclude, if we solve the social-role acquisition problem, we can solve the
explainable AI problem, because we will be able to identify higher-order burden of
proof (and possibly protocols) that can be used to distribute computation to possi-
bly specialized agents. The explainable AI problem is at the root of our problems
in designing complex, adaptive AI systems, as illustrated by the confused use of
knowledge structures in the history of AI.
If we solve the social-role acquisition problem, we can also improve the func-
tioning of our institutions, because we would have a better environmental model in
which to implement and test new institutional mechanisms, and in which to interpret
social data.
Automating the social role acquisition problem from scratch would require
the acquiring agent to be embedded in the social system in the same—or a very
similar—way humans are. This is at present not a realizable condition. A first step
towards solving the social-role acquisition problem is however realizable: consid-
ering collective requirements as those that communities reify in institutions, and
applying the lessons that can be learned there in engineering.
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